

Message Text

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JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, TH
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR FY79

REF: STATE 133136

SUMMARY: THE MAINTENANCE OF THAILAND AS AN INDEPENDENT,
NON-COMMUNIST AND ESSENTIALLY PRO-WESTERN ENTITY REMAINS
KEY TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA. THAILAND SEES ITSELF AND IS PERCEIVED
BY THE OTHER NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF THE AREA,
PARTICULARLY MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND INDONESIA, AS THE
LINCHPIN OF REGIONAL SECURITY. IN THIS CONTEXT, VITAL
SEA AND AIR ROUTES OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE BOTH TO THE U.S.

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AND JAPAN WOULD BE SEVERELY AFFECTED BY REGIONAL
INSTABILITY. WITHIN THAILAND AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
SIGNIFICANT U.S. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS ARE AT
STAKE. IN THE INTERNATIONAL BATTLE AGAINST THE NARCOTICS
TRADE, ACCESS TO COOPERATION FROM THAILAND ARE
ESSENTIAL. THAILAND HAS BEEN A HAVEN FOR THE MORE THAN
100,000 REFUGEES WHO HAVE FLED THE INDOCHINA STATES. AS

AN EXPORTER OF FOOD, THAILAND IS A COUNTRY WITH WHICH THE U.S. CAN SEEK COOPERATION ON SOME OF THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE. IN RELATION TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE AREA, WE RETAIN LIMITED ACCESS RIGHTS IN THAILAND WHICH, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD QUITE PROBABLY BE EXPANDED ON SHORT NOTICE IF NECESSARY. WHILE CONSIDERING TANGIBLE U.S. INTERESTS, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE EVIDENCE OF OUR CONSTANCY AND INTEREST IN THAILAND AND THE ENTIRE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION, AS MANIFESTED BY THE MODEST SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THAILAND, IS OF IMMEASURABLE IMPORTANCE TO REGIONAL CONFIDENCE. I THINK, THEREFORE, THAT IT IS VERY MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THAILAND. END SUMMARY.

1. THE BASIC OBJECTIVE OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN THAILAND IS TO ASSIST A FREE, NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRY WHICH HAS BEEN A CLOSE ALLY OF THE U.S. FOR MANY YEARS AND WITH WHICH WE STILL HAVE TREATY OBLIGATIONS TO ASSIST IT IN DEFENDING ITSELF. THIS, WE HOPE, WILL ENABLE THE THAI PEOPLE TO PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM AND THEREBY CONTINUE AS A BULWARK AGAINST ANY EXPANSIONIST INTENTIONS THAT MIGHT BE HARBORED BY THE COMMUNIST STATES OF INDOCHINA, PARTICULARLY VIETNAM. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IN THIS RESPECT IS THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF AND ACCESS TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND THE INDIAN OCEAN.

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2. OTHER OBJECTIVES INCLUDE THE MAINTENANCE OF THAILAND AS A SELF-SUFFICIENT STATE WITH WHICH THE U.S. SHARES A COMMON OUTLOOK ON A BROAD RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES. IF WE ARE TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT THE FLOW OF NARCOTICS FROM THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE TO MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES, WE MUST HAVE THE COOPERATION OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT. THE END OF SECURITY AND/OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WOULD PROVIDE US WITH LITTLE LEVERAGE TO ENCOURAGE THE THAI GOVERNMENT TO ALLOCATE ITS RELATIVELY SCARCE RESOURCES IN THIS DIRECTION. WHILE WE HAVE ONLY LIMITED ACCESS RIGHTS TO THAI MILITARY BASES, ONE OF OUR OBJECTIVES WOULD BE TO RETAIN SUCH ACCESS AND, PERHAPS, IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, TO EXPAND THEM. IN OUR CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WE SHOULD NOT NEGLECT THE VITAL ROLE THAT THAILAND HAS PLAYED IN OFFERING REFUGE TO MORE THAN 100,000 INDOCHINA REFUGEES, EVEN WHILE OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD REFUSE TO ACCEPT THEM. WE HOPE TO RETAIN LEVERAGE WITH THE THAI GOVERNMENT TO URGE PERMANENT AND HUMAN SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM. THE THAI HAVE ACTED WITH GREAT HUMANITARIANISM, BUT THERE ARE ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION WHICH THE THAI SEE AS IMPINGING ON THEIR

SECURITY CONCERNS. SPECIFICALLY, THE THAI ARE CONCERNED THAT, AMONG THE THOUSAND OR SO REFUGEES COMING INTO THAILAND FROM LAOS EACH MONTH, THERE MAY BE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE AND/OR SAPPER AGENTS. IF WE ARE ABLE TO ALLAY SOME OF THESE THAI SECURITY CONCERNS BY EVIDENCE OF OUR SUPPORT SUCH AS CONTINUED SECURITY ASSISTANCE, WE CAN EXPECT A GREATER RESPONSE FROM THE THAI TO OUR SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES. FINALLY, OUR ACCESS TO IMPORTANT RAW MATERIALS AND IMPORTANT REGIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IS ENHANCED BY OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THAILAND AND THE REGION.

3. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO THE CORRESPONDING QUESTIONS OF PARA 4, REFTEL:

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

JOINTSTATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

A) THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT (RTG) PERCEIVES A CURRENT THREAT FROM AN ONGOING, EXTERNALLY-SUPPORTED COMMUNIST INSURGENCY AND A MID-TERM DIRECT EXTERNAL THREAT FROM HANOI. THE INSURGENCY HAS BEEN GROWING AT A SLOW BUT STEADY PACE OVER THE PAST DECADE. THE INCREASE IN MILITARY CONTACTS AND RESULTANT CASUALTIES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS REFLECT THE STEADY GROWTH OF THE INSURGENCY AND ALSO THE INCREASED RTG EFFORTS TO ISOLATE, HARASS, AND SUPPRESS THE INSURGENTS. SUCCESSFUL SUPPRESSION IS SEEN AS A LONG-TERM, MULTI-STRATEGY, CAMPAIGN WITH RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AS THE MAIN THRUSTS. THE NOTABLE LACK OF SUCCESS ON THE PART OF THE INSURGENTS IN RECRUITING ETHNIC THAI AUGURS WELL FOR THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER, SEVERE ECONOMIC DECLINE,

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PROLONGED ECONOMIC STAGNATION, AND/OR SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENTS COULD HAVE A SEVERELY ADVERSE AFFECT. THE PERCEPTION OF THE TRHEAT FROM HANOI IS BASED ON VIETNAMESE CAPABILITIES. A "BREATHING SPACE" OVER THE NEAR TERM IS VISUALIZED WHILE HANOI DIGESTS ITS RECENT GAINS. GIVEN CONSOLIDATION AND STABILITY IN VIETNAM AND LAOS, THE LARGE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE ARE SEEN AS A DIRECT THREAT TO THAILAND. MISSION ASSESSMENT ESSENTIALLY CORRESPONDS WITH THAT OF THE RTG. NO ONE KNOWS WHAT MISCHIEF HANOI MAY BE UP TO IN FIVE YEARS, BUT NO RESPONSIBLE MILITARY PLANNER COULD IGNORE THE POTENTIAL USE OF VIETNAM'S MILITARY MACHINE. GIVEN HANOI'S PRESENT POSTURE VIS-A-VIS THAILAND, WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO AS WELL-CONSIDERED A STATE O MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AS THAILAND IS ABLE TO SUSTAIN.

B) INSURGENCY AND HANOI'S CAPAPBILITES ARE THE MAJOR CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS. HOWEVER, UNFORSEEN EVENTS SUCHA AS A MAJOR OIL DISCOVERY IN DISPUTED AREAS OF THE GULF OF THAILAND OR THE ANDAMAN SEA, OR FISHING DISPUTES, COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS CONFRONTATIONS WITH OTHER NEIGHBORS IN THE AREA.

C) THE RTGG'S PLANNED UPGRADING AND EXPANSION OF ITS ARMED FORCES IS AIMED BOTH AT THE INSURGENCY AND THE EXTERNAL THREAT. PARAMILITARY FORCES, PRIMARILY PROVINCIAL POLICE, BORDER PATROL POLICE AND VOLUNTEER DEFENSE CORPS, CURRENTLY WITH A STRENGTH OF ABOUT 100,000 ARE PROJECTED TO INCREASE BY 50 OR 60 PERCENT OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ROYAL THAI ARMY PLANS TO ACTIVATE FORTY LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALIONS EQUIPPED OLY WITH SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT MORTARS DURING THE NEXT DECADE WITH A PRIMARY MISSION OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY. ACTIVATION OF TWO ADDITIONAL STANDARD INFANTRY

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BATTALIONS BY 1980, INCREASED ARTILLERY SUPPORT AND THE EXPANSION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS WILL INCREASE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES AND PROVIDE A MORE CREDIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN ANTI-ARMOR AND ANTI-AIR CAPABILITIES OF BOTH THE RTA AND RTAF ARE PLANNED THROUGH THE MID EIGHTIES TO PRESENT A GREATER DETERRENT TO CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. THE PRESERVATION OF AN INDEPENDENT AND FRIENDLY THAILAND, CAPABLE OF CONTAINING AND SUPPRESSING THE INSURGENCY, MAINTAINING INTERNAL ORDER AND PRESENTING A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, IS IN THE U.S. INTERESTS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. THE THAI ARE POORLY EQUIPPED TO COUNTER AN EXTERNAL AIR AND ARMOR THREAT. FAILURE BY THE THAI TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT TO ESTABLISH A CREDIBLE DETERRENT COULD INVITE VIETNAMESE ADVENTURISM AND THE RAPID DEFEAT OF THAILAND.

D) THE ROYAL THAI ARMED FORCES (RTARF) ARE ABOUT 90 PER CENT EQUIPPED WITH U.S. HARDWARE. FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT FOR EQUIPMENT ON HAND, SPARE PARTS AND REPAIR AND RETURN, ON AN FMS CASH BASIS, WILL BE A HIGH PRIORITY. THE RTGG HAS AGREED TO PURCHASE THE U.S.-OWNED AMMUNITION IN THAILAND (AIT) IN FOUR INCREMENTS, FY76-79. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE FMS PURCHASE OF THE FINAL INCREMENT (APPROXIMATELY US DOLS NINE MILLION) WILL BE A HIGH PRIORITY ITEM. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE ARTICLES, IN PRIORITY ORDER, RTG IS LIKELY TO SEEK TO ACQUIRE IN FY-79 (DOLLARS IN MILLIONS):

ARTICLE	FMS CASH	FMS CREDIT	COMMERCIAL
AIT	\$9	-	-
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE	\$17	-	-
AIRCRAFT SUPPORT	\$19	\$5	\$2.5

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WEAPONS

(SMALL ARMS)	\$1	-	-
(HOWITZERS, MORTARS)	\$2	-	-
TANKS, TRUCKS	\$11	\$8	-
(17 EA M-60, ASST TRUCKS)			

AIRCRAFT \$68 \$3 \$30
(F-5E/F, UH-1H, BELL 214,
C-123 MOD)

NAVAL CRAFT - \$7 -
(PATROL CRAFT, LCU, LCVP)

MISSILES \$5 \$7 -
(AIM-9J, TOW, DRAGON)

COMMAND AND CONTROL \$5 - -
(COMMO, TACAN, RADAR)

THE RTARF WILL SEEK, AND CAN FULLY UTILIZE, AND ANNUAL
IMET PROGRAM OF APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION DOLLARS. THE
DEFENSE ARTICLES LISTED ABOVE ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE
THAI PLANS TO EXPAND AND UPGRADE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND WITH
US OBJECTIVES AS DISCUSSED ABOVE. FAILURE TO OBTAIN
FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT FOR U.S. WEAPONS NOW ON HAND WOULD
SERIOUSLY DEGRADE RTARF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES. FAILURE
TO SUPPLY INDICATED INVESTMENT ITEMS WOULD NEGATE RTARF
PLASN FOR FORCE EXPANSION AND REPLACEMENT OF OBSOLETE
EQUIPMENT OR FORCE THE THAI TO PROCURE LIKE EQUIPMENT FROM
THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES. ALTHOUGH USE OF OTHER COUNTRY
SOURCES WOULD NOT APPEAR ON THE SURFACE, TO BE CONTRARY TO
U.S. INTERESTS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES,
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ALREADY MARGINAL, WOULD BE SEVERELY AFFECTED BY INCREASED
SUPPLY OF DIVERSE EQUIPMENT FROM OTHER SOURCES, RESULTING
IN AN OVERALL DEGRADATION OF RTARF CAPABILITIES.
MISSION FEELS THAT THE PROJECTED ACQUISITION SCHEDULE OF
THE THAI ARMED FORCES IS REASONABLY IN BALANCE WITH THE
SECURITY THREAT THE COUNTRY FACES.

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

E) ACQUISITION OF THE DEFENSE ITEMS DESCRIBED IN PARA 4(D)
SHOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE A NOTICEABLE IMPACT ON THAILAND'S
ECONOMY, DEBT SERVICE CAPABILITY OR DEVELOPMENT PLANS.
THE PROJECTED DEFENSE BUDGET FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS REMAINS
AT ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL RTG BUDGET (IT HAS
HOVERED IN THE 15 TO 20 PERCENT RANGE FRO THE PAST SEVERAL
YEARS). AS A PERCENT OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, DEFENSE
SPENDING IS ABOUT 4 PER CENT OF GDP AND UNDER 5 PER CENT
WHEN INTERNAL SECURITY IS INCLUDED. THAILAND, EVEN WITH
ITS HISTORY OF MILITARY-DOMINATED GOVERNMENTS, HAS NOT BEEN
A FREE SPENDER ON UNNECESSARY ARMAMENTS, AND DEFENSE SPEDNING
IS SUBJECT TO THE SAME RIGOROUS BUDGETARY REVIEW AS OTHER
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES. TO BE SURE, THE HEIGHTENED THREAT
OF VIETNAM AND THAIL UNCERTAINTIES REGARDING U.S. POLICY
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HAVE INCREASED THE GOVERNMENT'S SENSE OF URGENCY IN MODERN-
IZING THE ARMED FORCES, BUT WE DO NOT SEE ANY EVIDENCE
THAT MILITARY SPENDING HAS IMPEDED OR WILL IMPEDE DEVELOP-
MENT OR DISTORT THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES. THE RTG,
INCLUDING THE MILITARY, VIEW RURAL DEVELOPMENT AS AN
IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF ITS OVERALL COUNTER-INSURGENCY
STRATEGY. THE GOVERNMENT HAS AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE ARMS
IN THE AMOUNT OF DOLS 1 BILLION BUT NO SPECIFIC TIME FRAME
WAS INDICATED, AND SO FAR NO LARGE, UNREASONABLE EXPENDI-
TURES OR LOANS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THIS PURPOSE. THAILAND'S
ECONOMY REMAINS VERY SOUND, WITH A LARGELY AGRICULTURAL
BASE. ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE POSITION, RESULTING
FROM A DIVERSIFIED MIX OF EXPORTS AND TRADITIONALLY
CAUTIOUS FISCAL POLICIES, IS ENVIABLE.

F) A REQUIREMENT FOR THE PRESENCE OF ADDITIONAL USG OR CIVILIAN CONTACT PERSONNEL IS NOT FORESEEN. JUSMAG IS DRAWING DOWN FROM A FY77 STRENGTH OF 117 MILITARY AND 15 U.S. CIVILIANS TO A PROPOSED FY 78 AUTHORIZATION OF 40 MILITARY AND 7 U.S. CIVILIANS. THIS SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT, DURING FY79, TO ACCOMPLISH THE DELIVERY AND TRANSFER OF MAP ARTICLES FROM PRIOR YEAR ORDERS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE ANTICIPATED SALES AND TRASFERS.

G) COMPARABLE KINDS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES ARE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. THE THAI PREFER U.S. PURCHASES FOR TWO MAJOR REASONS: THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH REPAIR PARTS AND FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT HAS BEEN BETTER WITH U.S. EQUIPMENT; THEIR LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES ARE DEGRADED BY A MIX OF SIMILAR EQUIPMENT REQUIRING DUAL CAPABILITY IN MAINTENANCE, TRAINING, TOOLS AND TEST EQUIPMENT AND REPAIR PARTS STOCKAGE. NEVERTHELESS, THE THAI HAVE GONE TO THIRD COUNTRIES, (FRG, SINGAPORE, ISRAEL, AND ITALY) WHEN THE
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U.S. HAS DENIED A SALE OR WHEN PRICE/AVAILABILITY HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE ELSEWHERE. WE EXPECT THE THAI WOULD SEEK TO ACQUIRE INDICATED DEFENSE ARTICLES ELSEWHERE IF THE U.S. DENIED THE REQUEST.

H) WE SEE NO BREACH OF OUR BASIC ARMS CONTROL POLICY BY ANTICIPATED MILITARY SALES TO THAILAND. VIETNAM, THE GREATEST POTENTIAL THREAT, HAS COMPARABLE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT AND IN LARGER AMOUNTS. OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES ALSO POSSESS SIMILARY WEAPONRY. A POSSIBLE EXCEPTION IS THE TOW MISSILE SYSTEM WHICH IS PLANNED TO BE POISED IN NORTHEAST THAILAND AGAINST THE ARMORED THREAT FROM VIETNAM. THE RELEASE OF THIS SYSTEM IS UNDER STUDY AT STATE/DOD LEVEL.

I) THE FY78 CPD ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAILAND STATES THAT 4,029 PERSONS HAD BEEN ARRESTED UNDER NARC ORDER 22. AS OF MAY 12 THERE WERE 1108 IN DETENTION UNDER THIS ORDER, THE VAST MAJORITY BEING PETTY CRIMINALS. 64 HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH ONE OF THE THREE CATEGORIES INVOLVING POLITICAL CONDUCT. ALL ORDER 22 CASES ARE REVIEWED EVERY TWO MONTHS AND RELEASES MADE. FOR EXAMPLE, 613 WERE FREED IN MAY, 43 OF WHOM FELL INTO THE "POLITICAL" CATEGORY. OF THE MORE THAN 3,000 PERSONS, MOSTLY STUDENTS, WHO WERE ARRESTED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLENCE AT THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ON OCTOBER 6 1976, ONLY 23 ARE STILL IN DETENTION, THE REMAINDER HAVING BEEN RELEASED OUTRIGHT OR FREED ON BAIL. ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION IN 74 CASES (MOST OF WHOM ARE OUT ON BAIL), AND CHARGES MAY BE DROPPED IN SOME OF THESE. THERE HAVE

BEEN NO KNOWN CASES OF DETAINEES BEING SUBJECT TO TORTURE, CRUEL, OR INHUMAN TREATMENT. IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF INSUFFICIENT ATTENTION WERE GIVEN TO THE OTHER CATEGORIES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAILAND. THE THAI GOVERNMENT ALLOCATES THE BULK OF ITS BUDGET RESOURCES FOR THE PROVISION OF ESSENTIAL HUMAN NEEDS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT. THERE IS COMPLETE FREEDOM OF RELIGION, TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION.

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DESPITE THE OBVIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE MASSIVE INFLUX OF INDOCHINA REFUGEES, THAILAND TODAY IS THE SAFEHAVEN FOR 77,000 REFUGEES IN THE CAMPS AND ADDITIONAL THOUSANDS OUTSIDE THEM. AT THE RISK OF DEATH, LAO, VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIANS FLEE THE HOME COUNTRIES AND CONTINUE TO POUR INTO THAILAND AT THE RATE OF 1,000 OR SO PER MONTH. BY ACCEPTING THESE REFUGEES, THE THAI ARE MAKING SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THEIR LESS FORTUNATE NEIGHBORS. THE THAI HAVE BEEN SENSITIVE TO U.S. CONCERNS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IS WELL RECOGNIZED WITHIN THE RTG. SO LONG AS WE ARE PROVIDING SECURITY ASSISTANCE, WE CAN EXERCISE SOME INFLUENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS WHERE THAI NATIONAL SECURITY IS NOT INVOLVED. WITHOUT THAT LINKAGE, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD WE COULD AFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES HERE.

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J) THAILAND IS NOT AN ARMS SUPPLIER. IN VIEW OF ITS LIMITED ARMS PRODUCTION CAPABILITY, THE PROBLEM OF ENLISTING SUPPORT FROM THAILAND TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT AS A SUPPLIER IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS DOES NOT COME INTO QUESTION. THE THAI FIRMLY BELIEVE THEY FACE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT AND ARE FULLY DETERMINED TO EXPAND AND MODERNIZE THEIR ARMED FORCES TO MEET THAT THREAT. WITHIN THEIR ECONOMIC CAPABILITY, THEY WILL PURCHASE ARMS FROM THE U.S. OR FROM OTHER SOURCES. THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT THAT WE COULD RESTRAIN THEM FROM PURCHASING ARMS WHICH THEY FEEL ARE ESSENTIAL FOR THEIR SELF DEFENSE.

K) THE IMET PROGRAM IN THAILAND HAS BEEN ORIENTED TOWARDS PROFESSIONAL AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TYPE TRAINING, WHICH CURRENTLY UTILIZED ABOUT THREE-FOURTHS OF THE PROGRAM. SOME EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING CONTINUES AND ITS PROJECTED TO FY79, PRIMARILY TO INCREASE IN-COUNTRY TRAINING CAPABILITIES. THAI STUDENTS COMPLETE EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING IN CONUS AND THEN RECEIVE ADDITIONAL TRAINING AS
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INSTRUCTORS IN ORDER TO INCREASE TRAINING CAPABILITIES IN THAI SERVICE SCHOOLS. SOME INCREASE IN FMS TRAINING WOULD BE EXPECTED IF NOT AVAILABLE ON A GRANT BASIS. HOWEVER, TERMINATION OF GRANT TRAINING WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE CONUS TRAINING, DUE TO URGENT EQUIPMENT PRIORITIES, U.S. INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY THE CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONAL TRAINING. IMPROVED PLANNING AND LOGISTICS, A CURRENT WEAKNESS IN THE THAI MILITARY, WILL LEAD TO MORE EFFICIENT USE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND IMPROVE THAI CAPABILITY TO MEET THE POTENTIAL MILITARY CHALLENGE. THE RTG HAS AGREED TO OST SHARING FOR IMET. SINCE 1 JULY 1975, THEY HAVE PAID TRANSOCEANIC TRAVEL; BEGINNING 1 OCTOBER 1976, ALL TRAVEL. THEY WILL PAY ALL TRAVEL PLUS ONE-HALF OF LIVING COSTS IN FY78 AND ALL TRAVEL AND LIVING COSTS IN FY79, PRECISELY TO MAXIMIZE TRAINING DOLLARS.

4. CONCLUSION: THAILAND IS THREATENED BY AN INTERNAL INSURGENCY AND FACES WELL ARMED AND LESS-THAN-FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS IN THE EAST AND NORTHEAST, U.S. INTERESTS AS DESCRIBED EARLIER WILL BE SERVED BY A STABLE, FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT IN THAILAND CAPABLE OF SUPPRESSING THE INSURGENCY, MAINTAINING INTERNAL ORDER AND PRESENTING A REASONABLE DETERRENCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. A MODEST U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WILL FURTHER THESE

INTERESTS AND HELP US ACHIEVE OUR REGIONAL AND BILATERAL OBJECTIVES. I BELIEVE A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR FY79 AT THE CURRENTLY PROJECTED LEVEL, I.E., DOLS 1.0 MILLION IMET AND DOLS 30 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS IS REASONABLE FOR THAILAND'S NEEDS AND IN LINE WITH OUR INTERESTS. REQUESTS FOR CASH FMS TRANSFERS SHOULD BE FAVORABLE CONSIDERED FOR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES. SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO COUNTER THE PERCEIVED AIR AND ARMORED THREATS SHOULD
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BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.
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Message Attributes

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Disposition Action: RELEASED
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Drafter: n/a
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Expiration:
Film Number: D770237-0716
Format: TEL
From: BANGKOK JOINT
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770793/aaaaddh.tel
Line Count: 565
Litigation Code IDs:
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Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
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Office: ACTION PM
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
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Review Date: 18-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
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Review Release Date: n/a
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SAS ID: 1971813
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR FY79
TAGS: MASS, TH
To: STATE
Type: TE
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